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TORTS-OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND-THE
INVITEE-LICENSEE CLASSIFICATION YIELDS IN
FAVOR OF A SINGLE DUTY OWED TO ALL
Upon invitation, James Rowland, Jr. entered Miss Christian's apartment
as a social guest. While using the bathroom, the porcelain handle of the cold
water faucet broke causing Rowland to suffer severed tendons and nerves in
his right hand. In an action by Rowland against Miss Christian for his
medical and hospital expenses, loss of wages, damage to his clothing, and
$100,000 general damages, the California Superior Court entered a summary
judgment for defendant pursuant to her motion. The accompanying affidavits
stated that two weeks prior to the accident, Miss Christian informed her
landlord that the faucet handle had cracked, but that neither Miss Christian
nor the lessor had corrected the situation. The record does not indicate
whether or not the crack was obvious upon normal inspection.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding as a matter of
law that a summary judgment was not proper since a jury could reasonably
conclude that failure to warn the plaintiff of the defective condition constituted negligence. In so holding, the court in essence reversed an earlier
holding to the effect that a landowner was not obliged to warn a licensee of a
defective condition on the premises, 2 thereby abandoning the traditional test
of liability of an owner or occupier of land advanced therein. Justice Peters,
speaking for the majority, stated that the proper test to be applied to determine the liability of an owner or occupier of land is: whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the
probability of injury to others, irrespective of plaintiff's status as trespasser,
licensee or invitee. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
This test eliminates the terms, "trespasser," "licensee" and "invitee" from
the legal vocabulary. The California Supreme Court thus becomes the first
court to reach a decision concerning landowners and entrants neither by classifying the entrant in a specific category, nor by making an exception to the
general rule limiting the landowner's liability; rather, this court predicated
its decision simply on general principles of negligence law. So predicated, this
decision is the last step in an erosion process which began almost as soon as
the classifications were established. By reviewing the development of the
traditional classification structure, this note attempts to reveal certain flaws
inherent in the structure, which flaws have caused the California court to
consider the classifications invalid despite more than a century of their use.
The classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee evolved in the nine1 Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. App. 1967).
2

Fisher v, General Petroleum Corp., 123 Cal. App. 2d 770, 267 P.2d 841 (1954).
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teenth century, an era which had not yet abandoned the basic feudal
principle that an owner is sovereign on his own property. Professor Marsh
observed that during this era the "privileged position of the landowner was
taken for granted." 3 Thus historically, the courts have had to cope with a
property-biased philosophy, based on the principle that owners and occupiers
of land have the right to make use of their land for their own benefit and
according to their own desires, and further, that any invasion of a close
could be neither justified nor excused. With this doctrine as his security,
the landowner claimed dominion over infinite space above and below his
surface, asserted the right to do whatever he pleased within those boundaries,
and claimed a right of action against any intruder. A necessary corollary
thereto was his immunity from any duty to one coming on his premises. 4
Many of the earlier English cases are indicative of the influence of this
principle without articulating it. Actions against a landowner for injuries
arising from the condition of the premises or the owner's activities on the
premises were summarily dismissed; 5 the courts held simply that such an
action against a landowner is not maintainable. 6
The first successful assault on the landowner's wall of immunity came in
the case of Indermaur v. Dames.7 In this case the plaintiff came onto the
defendant's premises pursuant to a contract. While plaintiff was attending to
the business prescribed in the contract, he fell down an open, unguarded shaft
and was injured. The court held that the plaintiff was not of a class of persons
described as "licensees," but rather of a class which go upon the land on
business concerning the occupier; therefore, such occupier was held to owe
to the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care in making the premises safe.8 The
landowner's immunity from liability to entrants was thus subjected to its
3 Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers,
69 L.Q. REV. 182 (1953); see generally Comment, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1957).
4 Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in
Tort, 21 MIcH. L. REV. 495 (1923). The rule closely restricting the landowner's liability
to those on the land other than for the benefit of the landowner has been traced to the
dominional sovereignty traditionally ascribed to the ownership of land under the feudal
system, under which even the King's courts had no concern with what the landowner
did on his own property. See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, at
739-40 (1937) ; 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1432 (1956).
5Iway v. Hedges, 9 Q.B.D. 80 (1889); Tolhausen v. Davies, 57 L.J.Q.B. 392, aff'd
58 L.J.Q.B. 98 (C.A. 1888); Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856);
Wilkinson v. Fairrie, 158 Eng. Rep. 1038 (Ex. 1862); Hounsell v. Smyth, 141 Eng. Rep.
1033 (C-P. 1860).
6

See, e.g., Stiefsohn v. Brook, Bond, & Co., 53 J.P. 790, T.L.R. 684 (1889).

7L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866).
8Accord, Kroger Co. v. Thomas, 277 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1960); Andrews v. Goetz,
104 So. 2d 653 (Fla. App. 1958); Dunham v. Hubert W. White, Inc., 203 Minn. 82,
279 N.W. 839 (1938); Nelson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 211 Iowa 592, 231 N.W. 665
(1930).
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first exception, i.e., "business invitees," and with it the foundation for the
traditional classifications was created. By this approach, the three classes of
entrants onto land were trespassers, licensees and invitees. Those who entered
the land without permission or privilege were trespassers, and those who
entered with the occupier's permission but only for their own purposes not
connected with the occupier's interests, were licensees. To these two classes of
entrants the landowner was under only a duty not to wilfully and wantonly
injure them. Those who entered for the purpose of the occupier's business or
interest were invitees, to whom the landowner owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the premises safe for their visit. 9 One could imagine that
the facility of the formula (i.e., merely decide the plaintiff's status, then
plug in the respective duty owing) lured many judges into using these
classifications without analyzing the circumstances. Courts were eager to
embrace this mechanistic "magic formula."
What I particularly wish to emphasize is that there are three different classesinvitees, licensees, trespassers .... Now the line that separates each of these three
classes is an absolutely rigid line. There is no half-way house, no no-man's land

between adjacent territories. 10

Several years subsequent to Indemaur, the antithesis to the traditional
classifications and the immunity which they offered to the landowner developed when Brett, the Master of the Rolls, made the first attempt to state
a formula of duty.
Whenever one person is placed by circumstances in such a position in regard to
another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize
that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the person or property
of the other, a duty arises to use the ordinary skill and care to avoid such danger."
Shortly thereafter, Brett, who had then become Lord Esher, rejected his

own formula as far too broad,' 2 and sought an alternative method of implementing his general concept. Concurrently, American courts likewise fostered
both the development of the classification structure Indemaur, and attempts
to implement Lord Esher's concept of duty, sometimes referring to the concept
as that of "limitations of duties."' 3 As in the English courts, the largest single
area in which these limitations were applied involved owners and occupiers of
land. Hence, though attempting to implement Lord Esher's broad concepts,
9 See generally supra notes 4, 5 and 7.
10 Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371.

"1Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
12 LeLievre and Dennes v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
13 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See generally
Green, The Duty in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLuM. L. REV. 1014 (1928).
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the American courts accepted the traditional classifications of trespasser,
licensee and invitee and the limitations on duty they imposed, but did so
within a framework of exceptions. The landowner's wall of immunity began
to crumble under the weight of these exceptions, and the erosion process
began. The most notable of these early judicially-founded exceptions to the
general limitations on duty imposed by the classifications, are the attractive
nuisance doctrine,' 4 the anticipated trespasser' 5 and the discovered trespasser. 16 These exceptions caused problems to the courts, since the cases all
rested on a value judgment between the landowner's right to use his land
according to his own desires and the rights of those in the vicinity to be free
from physical harm. The result has been a set of limitations of duty, quite
complicated in their detailed variations, and tending to be quite rigidly
17
distinguished.
The next blow to the land-occupier resulted from the courts' difficulty in
defining "invitee."'' 5 Presently, there are two tests to determine who is an in20
vitee: (1) the so-called "economic benefit"' 9 test; and (2) the "invitation"
test. In the "economic benefit" test there must be either an actual or a
potential economic advantage to the occupier of the premises resulting from
the entrant's visit before the latter may become an invitee. The invitation
14
Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. R. 393 (1875). See
Eldridge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 32 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 339

(1965).

Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255 P. 380 (1927); Imre
v. Riegel Paper Corp., 24 N.J. 438, 132 A.2d 505 (1957); Eldridge, Tort Liability to
'5

Trespassers, 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 32, 34-38 (1937).

16Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940);
Castonguay v. Acme Knitting Machine & Needle Co., 83 N.H. 1, 136 A. 702 (1927);
See Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 H~Av. L. REV. 403 (1914).
17

PROSSER, TORTS § 58 (3d ed. 1964).

18 See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MNN. L. REV. 573 (1942); James,

Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE
L.J. 605 (1954); Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 142, 340 (1920). As Denning L.J.
said in Dunster v. Abbott, [1954) 1 W.L.R. 58: "A canvasser who comes on your
premises without your consent is a trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee.
Not until you do business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have done business
with him, it seems rather strange that your duty towards him should be different when
he comes up to your door from what it is when he goes away. Does he change his colour
in the middle of the conversation? What is the position when you discuss business with
him and it comes to nothing? No confident answer can be given to these questions. Such
is the morass into which the law has floundered in trying to distinguish between licensees
and invitees."

19 Supra note 8.
20

See, e.g., Dowd v. Portsmouth Hospital, 105 N.H. 53, 193 A.2d 788 (1963) ; Bunnell

v. Waterbury Hospital, 103 Conn. 520, 131 A., 501 (1925) ; Demarest v. Palisades Realty

& Amusement Co., 101 N.J.L. 66, 127 A. 536, 38 A.L.R. 352 (1925).
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test is based on an implied representation made by the occupier to the
public--i.e., by holding the land open to the public, thus preparing it for
their reception-the existence of benefit to the landowner accruing from the
visit notwithstanding. The latter test broadens the classification of invitee.
Regardless which test is used, however, the "invitee" class has been consistently growing. 21 A corollary to the extention of the "invitee" class has been
the court's problem of defining a licensee. Nearly all decisions are in agreement that a social guest, even though he may have been cordially invited
and urged to come, is not in law an invitee-a distinction which has puzzled
many students of the law. The guest, as a licensee, is owed no duty of in22
spection or affirmative care to make the premises safe for his visit.

The inconsistencies in this area have been unreasonable. One of the areas of
conflict resulting from the classification of licensee (not the social guest-type)
has been the courts' relentless effort to find some possible pecuniary profit to
the possessor in an effort to push the entrant over Lord Denedin's "rigid
line" 23 into the invitee class. Courts proceeding in this direction have found
economic advantage in the form of possible advice or assistance which might
be given to another about to buy, 24 and in the chance that the plaintiff might
see something he likes.2 5 Even children 26 and friends who accompany
customers 27 have been held to be invitees. On the other hand, the courts
have been rather reluctant in putting social guests into the invitee class even
28
where the guest renders some incidental service to his host.
21 Infra notes 24, 25, 26 and 27.
22

See, e.g., Quinlan v. Quinlan, 76 N.J. Super. 11, 183 A.2d 712 (1962); Cordula v.
Dietrich, 9 Wis. 2d 211, 101 N.W.2d 126 (1960); Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469,
78 A.2d 693 (1951) ; Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1934).
23 Supra note 10.
24 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Donovan, 137 A.2d 716 (1958); Kennedy v. Phillips, 319
Mo. 573, 5 S.W.2d 33 (1928).
25 Campbell v. Weathers, 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 (1941). In this case plaintiff
entered defendant's cigar store and loitered for fifteen to twenty minutes without making
a purchase, and then went to the back of the building to use the washroom. He stepped
into an open trap door and was injured. The court, without using the more inclusive
invitation test, found the plaintiff to be an invitee on the basis that he might have become
interested in a new brand of cigars on display which he might have purchased then or on
some future occasion.
26
Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958) ; Valunas v. J. J. Newberry
Co., 336 Mass. 305, 145 N.E.2d 685 (1957). Contra, O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co.,
307 Ill. 197, 138 N.E. 625 (1923); Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30 Ga. App.
490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923).
27 Goldsmith v.Cody, 351 Mich. 380, 88 N.W.2d 268 (1958); Nave v. Hixenbaugh, 180
Kan. 370, 304 P.2d 482 (1956).
28
See, e.g., Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 Ill.
App. 2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569 (1964); Lucas
v. Barner, 56 Wash. 2d 136, 351 P.2d 492 (1960); Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469,
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Aside from these problems, the biggest blow to the landowner's position of
limited liability has come through the courts' expansion of those duties owed
to a licensee. The earlier decisions frequently held that there was no duty
owed a licensee except the duty to refrain from "wilful or wanton misconduct. ' 29 Some courts still so hold. 30 With an increasing regard for human
safety, however, there has been a tendency on the part of many courts to
apply those general principles of negligence law which were formulated in
Heaven v. Pender.3x Realizing the fundamental antitheses between "foreseeability of harm" and the "traditional classifications," the courts have been
anxious to find exceptions to the classifications in order to impose upon an
owner or occupier the duty to exercise ordinary care in any event. In each
case, once the exception is found, the licensee becomes indistinguishable from
an invitee, and thus is owed a duty of ordinary reasonable care. These courts
have found a distinct line between harm caused by the static, passive condition of the premises, and harm caused by the activity or current operations
of the occupier. 32 The earlier cases which have held a landowner to an
obligation to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a licensee with
regard to active operations were basically concerned with the use of railroads 33 or machinery. 34 However, more recently, the principle has been
applied to a greater number of fact situations. The following cases illustrate
how the courts have side-stepped traditional classification rules limiting
liability, by finding the exception which allows them to impose a general
negligence standard:
(1) The defendant-landowner fell down her stairs and injured the plaintiff, who was standing at the bottom of that stairway. The court noted that
it is now generally held in cases involving injury resulting from active conduct, rather than mere passive condition of the premises, that the landowner
78 A.2d 693 (1951). See generally Schiebel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d
453 (1951).
29 See, e.g., Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Potter, 113 Ohio St. 591, 150 N.E. 44
(1925); O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R. Co., 209 Mass. 449, 95 N.E. 861 (1911).
30 Duff v. United States, 171 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Hill v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
153 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1946) ; Biggs v. Bear, 320 Ill. App. 597, 51 N.E.2d 799 (1943).
31

Supra note 11.
See, e.g., Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221 (1944)
Lambert, Recent important Tort Cases, 16 NACCA L.J. 317 (1955) ; infra notes 35-38
and 40-43.
32

33 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Blevins, 293 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1956); Smithwick v. Pacific Electric Ry., 206 Cal. 291, 274 P. 980 (1929); Pomponio v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 66 Conn. 528, 34 A. 491 (1895).
34 See, e.g., Standard Steel Car Co. v. McGuire, 161 F. 527 (3d Cir. 1908) ; DeHaven v.
Hennessey Bros. & Evans Co., 137 F. 472 (6th Cir. 1905).
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may be held liable for failure to exercise ordinary care toward a licensee
whose presence on the land is known or should reasonably be known to the
possessor. Accordingly, even if plaintiff were a licensee rather than a business
visitor, it is clear that defendant had a duty to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injuring her.

5

(2) Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and from time to time helped
each other with various projects on their respective premises. Plaintiff alleged
that while he was on defendant's land helping to assemble and join pipe,
defendant negligently failed to warn him before giving the pipe a hard turn,
thereby injuring the plaintiff. The action was dismissed on the ground that
plaintiff was a mere social guest toward whom defendant owed only a duty
to refrain from wilful injury. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, reversed and held that in conducting activities on his land,
the occupier of premises owes a duty of reasonable care to both licensees,
including social guests, and invitees. Evidence of negligence was for the jury,
irrespective of whether plaintiff was deemed licensee or invitee.36
(3) Plaintiff, a social guest, was injured while defendant, his host, was
demonstrating a golf swing. The court explained that while the court had
often enunciated the rule that an owner or occupier of land owes no duty
to a licensee other than the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure him,
almost invariably, where the rule had been applied, the licensee was injured
because of some defect in or the condition of the premises. Limiting the ruling
to active conduct, the court held an owner or occupier of land has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring a person who is on the land with
7
his permission.
(4) In an action for the wrongful death of a drowned youth, the court
held that liability could be predicated upon the active conduct of throwing
a party for a large number of youthful guests, knowing the dangers of a
swimming pool.3

8

As one commentator has so cogently observed:

The doctrine or theory that a property owner may be liable to a bare licensee, or
even to a trespasser, for "active negligence" constitutes an attempt to remedy a
perceived injustice by mitigating the old rule that the property owner was liable
to noninvitees only for wilful or wanton injuries. While the purpose of the doctrine
is a laudable one, the difficulties in drawing a line between active and passive
negligence make it an unsatisfactory means of reaching the desired end.8 9
85

Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).

36

Cropanese v. Martinez, 35 N.J. Super. 118, 113 A.2d 433 (1955).

87

Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963).

Hensen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965); This decision
has been characterized as an "ingenious process of finding active negligence .. " WIrTK',
SUMIMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Torts § 255, at 535-536 (Supp. 1967).
89 156 A.L.R. 1226, 1234.
38
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Quite closely related to active negligence, and sometimes indistinguishable,
are a line of cases which follow yet another exception to the limitations imposed by the classification structure: the "duty to warn of dangerous condition" cases. The theory behind these cases is that the possessor of land is
under a duty to exercise ordinary reasonable care to warn licensees of hidden
dangers known to the possessor.
(1) In an action brought by the plaintiff for injuries resulting from a fall
due to a newly waxed floor, the court held that even if the plaintiff was found
to be a mere licensee, the defendant, knowing of her presence, was under a
duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring her by a positive act of negligence
or by a breach of duty equivalent to such an act, and it could reasonably be
found that the failure to give warning of a slippery floor was such a breach
of duty.

40

(2) Defendant had hung plaintiff's coat in what appeared to be a closet,
but what was, in reality, an entrance to a cellar stairway. As plaintiff prepared to leave, she went to get her coat and fell down the stairway. The court
held that the only duty owed a licensee or trespasser was to see that he was
not injured by reason of wanton, wilful, or other active negligence but that
this does not preclude a finding that the owner of land might owe a gratuitous
licensee, whose presence was known, the duty to warn of a known danger involving an unreasonable risk to the licensee, which the possessor had reason
41
to believe that the licensee would not discover.
(3) Plaintiff, a photographer, went to defendant's depot to photograph
an arriving delegation. Unable to take pictures through the crowd, defendant's employees helped the plaintiff to a glass canopy which had warning
signs posted on it to "keep off." The court found that a failure to give an
42
oral warning was actionable negligence.
(4) Defendant had placed sand over portions of an icy walk and alleyway
but ran out of sand before he could do the front porch. As plaintiff, a social
guest, left after her visit, she slipped on the porch. The court held that the
"placing of the sand" could be either considered as active negligence for
which defendant would be liable to a licensee, or that the ice on the porch
48
was a condition for which defendant would be liable for his failure to warn.
These cases exemplify the manner in which modern courts, in an effort to
do justice, have developed subtle verbal refinements to define the standards
40 Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 A. 502

(1931). See, e.g., Choate v. Carter, 98

Ga. App. 375, 105 S.E.2d 909 (1958); Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 428, 194 P.2d 706 (1948). Contra, Fisher v. General Petroleum Corp., 123 Cal.
App. 2d 770, 267 P.2d 841 (1954).

41 Maher v. Voss, 46 Del. 418, 84 A.2d 527 (1951).
42 Mathias v. Denver Union Terminal R.R., 137 Colo. 224, 323 P.2d 624 (1958).
43Mistretta v. Alessi, 45 N.J. Super. 176, 131 A.2d 891 (1957). See generally 55
A.L.R.2d 525 (1957) for a collection of cases dealing with warning.
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of care which the landowner owes to the traditional categories of entrants.
In all these cases the finding of the exception has been a disguised attempt
to mitigate the traditional rules and apply a single duty, that of reasonable
care. These cases are also illustrative of what Justice Peters refers to as the
"subtleties and confusion" 44 which result from applying common law principles to the liability of the possessor of land. His reasoning is sound and
logical-simply stated, once a court recognizes that a possessor of land is
liable for active negligence 45 to a licensee or imposes a duty on the possessor
to warn a licensee of the conditions of the premises, 46 the court is in effect
imposing a standard of ordinary reasonable care on the possessor. Therefore,
once a court has reached this stage of progress, the word "licensee" and
the phrase "wilful and wanton" become obsolete. Hence, the classification
thus becomes meaningless. Justice Peters is not alone in his criticism. 47 In
speaking of the confusion and conflicts bred by the attempts to apply the
common law status classifications to an industrialized urban society with
complex economic and individual relationships, the United States Supreme
Court in Kermarec v. Compagnie Ggngrale Transatlantique48 noted that the
common law had moved, unevenly and with hesitation, toward imposing on
owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances.
The Court therein declined to import the traditional rules into admiralty
law.
In Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority,49 the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated:
In modern times the immunities have rightly, though gradually, been giving way to
the overriding social view that where there is foreseeability of substantial harm,
44 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 89, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
45

See, e.g., W. S. Fowler Rental Equipment Co. v. Skipper, 276 Ala. 593, 165 So. 2d
375 (1963) ; Fabrizio v. Youhas, 148 Conn. 426, 172 A.2d 69 (1961) ; Anderson v. Welty,
334 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); Vincent v. Superior Iron Works & Supply Co.,
170 So. 2d 184 (La. 1964) ; Draper v. Switous, 370 Mich. 468, 122 N.W.2d 698 (1963) ;
Henderson v. Baird, 100 Ga. App. 627, 112 S.E.2d 221 (1959) ; Krauth v. Geller, 54 N.J.
Super. 442, 149 A.2d 271 (1959) ; Lomberg v. Renner, 121 Vt. 311, 157 A.2d 222 (1960) ;
Le Compte v. Wardell, 134 Mont. 490, 333 P.2d 1028 (1958). See the dissent in Peter
Cunag v. McCarthy, 42 Ill. App. 2d 36, 191 N.E.2d 404 (1963) for a good comparison
between Michigan and Illinois Law.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342; see, e.g., Deacy v. McDonnell, 131 Conn.
101, 38 A.2d 181 (1944) ; Little v. Brutner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P.2d 1022 (1959) ; Snyder
v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J. Super. 336, 147 A.2d 572 (1962) ; Rushton v. Winters, 331
Pa. 78, 200 A. 60 (1938) ; Hamilton v. Union Oil Co., 216 Ore. 354, 339 P.2d 440 (1959) ;
Cutler v. Dushoff, 192 Pa. Super. 37, 159 A.2d 524 (1959) ; Holcombe v. Buckland, 130
F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1942).
47 Infra notes 50-53.
48358 U.S. 625 (1959).
d9 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313.
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landowners, as well as other members of society, should generally be subjected
to a reasonable duty of care to avoid it.50
In addition to the solution offered by Justice Peters, many legal writers
have questioned the applicability of the classifications and have offered
somewhat different approaches to the problem. 51 Some writers have suggested
the abolition of a distinction between invitees and licensees on the basis that
the classifications are not just, logical or reasonable.5 2 Thus far the only
jurisdiction which has been affected is Louisiana, which has raised the status
of social guest to that of an invitee.5 3 Lambert remarked, in discussing
Cropanese v. Martinez,54 that the court "refused to flounder in the morass
of the categories of classification."' 5 It was enough for the court that defendant's acts involved a risk of harm to plaintiff, and therefore, the law of
negligence imposed a duty upon the defendant.
In support of the decision in Rowland v. Christian it should be pointed
out that in 1957, in England, a statute was enacted which abolished the
distinction between licensees and invitees, and declared that the occupier
owes the same "common duty of care to both." ' 56
It is submitted that the true test of the possessor's liability should be
based on foreseeability of harm to others without regard to the terms,
"trespasser," "licensee" or "invitee." They tend only to add exceptions and
confusions to the law. The basic consideration, that a landowner is sovereign
on his property, must be balanced with the general security of human rights.
It has been shown that the law of negligence seeks to accomplish this within
the framework of rigid classifications, but the confusion and chaos which
has developed is overwhelming. It is time to abolish these outdated classifications, and to allow the general principles of negligence law to determine the
liability of possessors of land on an objective case-to-case basis. Why must
we continue to hide the fact that a "possessor must exercise ordinary care"
under a blanket of exceptions to general rule?
Richard Ungaretti
50 Id. at 319. See generally Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Good v.
Whan, 335 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1959).
51 McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured
While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REV. 45 (1936); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of
Land; Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954).
52 See generally Comment, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186, 191 (1957) "The legal cloak under
which a person comes does not fashion a veil of unforeseeability, hiding the eye of
vigilance from what human considerations compel it to see."
53 Alexander v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App.
1957). Cf. Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
54
Supra note 36.
55 Lambert, Recent Important Cases, 16 NACCA L.J. 317 (1955).
56 OccupIER's LIABILITY AcT, 5 & 6 Eliz. II c. 31.

